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Spousal Refusal: Preserving
Family Savings by "Just Saying
No" to Long-Term Care
Impoverishment
"Just Say No" just may save the family
savings. The little-used "Just Say No"
rule has been in effect since 1988 and,
though founded in federal law, is not
honored in most jurisdictions. This
review of New York and Florida
approaches to "Just Say No" issues
sheds light on future applications as
more cases present similar dilemmas.
By Scott M. Solkoff
The Need for Protection: Meet Daniel and
Dottie
Meet Daniel and Dottie, husband and wife, who
have been married twenty-seven years next month.
They lived in Chicago until moving to South
Florida in 1990. Daniel's first marriage ended in
divorce, and Dottie's first husband died of a heart
attack at fifty. Daniel and Dottie each have two
children from their previous marriages. When they
got married, Daniel and Dottie signed a prenuptial
agreement stating that each waives any claim or
right to the assets of the other. They have, to this
day, kept their assets separate and apart. Their
wills bypass each other, leaving all to their respec-
tive children.
Dottie and Daniel are typical of couples heading
into later marriages. They want to live with and
love each other in marriage until death do they
part, but they do not want the laws of their state to
dictate mutual support obligations. They want the
ability to provide for each other if they choose to
do so. They do not want to be obligated to provide
for each other by a default set of laws.
So, they did all of their planning just right. They
went to a good attorney. They got a sound prenup-
tial agreement. They kept their assets separate and
apart. Everything was going as planned.
Then along came the nursing home.
Daniel got sick and could no longer stay at
home. The nursing home bills began to mount. At
$60,000 per year for room and board alone, it took
only two years for Daniel to be impoverished.
When his assets dropped below the applicable asset
cap,' Dottie applied for Medicaid benefits to pay
for the cost of his nursing home care. Though
Daniel had nothing, the application was denied
because of Dottie's $280,000 in assets.
According to Medicaid rules in all of the fifty
states, in determining eligibility for Medicaid, the
state must consider "all the resources held by either
the institutionalized spouse, community spouse,' or
both.3" The state, therefore, adds up all of the mar-
ried couple's assets, no matter how those assets are
titled. All of Daniel and Dottie's assets together
total $280,000. The law then allows Dottie, as the
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community spouse, to deduct a resource allowance
that varies from state to state from the total assets.4
The difference between total assets and the "com-
munity spouse resource allowance" (CSRA) is
deemed to be available to the institutionalized
spouse, Daniel, and will cause ineligibility for
Medicaid benefits.'
For example, in Florida, where Dottie and
Daniel live, the CSRA is $84,120.6 Dottie's
$280,000 less the $84,120 CSRA means that
$195,880 of Dottie's (and her deceased husband's)
assets are deemed available by the government for
Daniel's nursing home care. Daniel is denied
Medicaid coverage because the government wants
Dottie to pay.
Despite Dottie and Daniel's best efforts, their
assets are almost completely unprotected. Their
savings may not pass to their respective children
upon death. In fact, it is more likely than not that
all of Dottie's assets will go first to Daniel's care
and then to her own care. Neither Dottie nor
Daniel benefit from their savings or from their
careful legal planning.
Dottie and Daniel illustrate an inequity that has
caused many elderly couples to divorce each other
in order to protect their life savings.' To be sure, if
Daniel and Dottie get divorced, Dottie's assets can-
not be counted as available to Daniel. But there are
many problems with divorce as an option for
Medicaid asset protection planning.
One problem with divorce is that, in most
states, both parties need to be competent in order
to obtain one. In some states, there must be a wait-
ing period of two or more years after an adjudica-
tion of incapacity. By the time the couple needs the
process, the spouses may not be mentally capable
of divorce. Another problem with divorce is that
the judge may require support or a reallocation of
resources that may not be helpful for Medicaid
purposes. Another problem, perhaps overarching
all, is that people who love each other and wish to
remain married may understandably not be able to
stomach a divorce for purely economic reasons.
It would make sense then, for the state to allow
spouses to maintain their own assets and to refuse
to make those assets available to the institutional-
ized spouse. With this allowance, the community
spouse would be able to keep an unlimited amount
of assets. Those assets could be used to supplement
the care of the institutionalized spouse, and to
ensure that the community spouse is not left desti-
tute at the expense of the institutionalized spouse!
This is the "Just Say No" rule.
Authority for the "Just Say No" Rule
The "Just Say No" law exists but has been
observed more in the breach than in the obser-
vance It has been the law of all fifty states since
1988 with passage of the Medicare Catastrophic
Care Act (MCCA).0 That law provides, in perti-
nent part, as follows:
The institutionalized spouse shall not be ineligible by
reason of resources determined under paragraph (2) to
be available for the cost of care where-(A) the insti-
tutionalized spouse has assigned to the State any rights
to support from the community spouse; (B) the insti-
tutionalized spouse lacks the ability to execute an
assignment due to physical or mental impairment but
the State has the right to bring an action against a
community spouse without such agreement; or (C) the
State determines that denial of eligibility would work
an undue hardship."
The law, therefore, allows an institutionalized
spouse to qualify for Medicaid benefits even
though he or she may have a spouse that chooses to
keep assets over the CSRA. The spouse retains the
assets, in any amount, and then refuses to make
them available for the institutionalized spouse's
costs of long-term care. In turn, the state seeks an
assignment of the institutionalized spouse's support
rights.
The "Just Say No" rule, though founded in fed-
eral law (the MCCA), is not honored in most juris-
dictions. The State of New York has been the
exception to this trend. New York codified the the-
ory in its own rules and state laws back in 1988
(following the MCCA) and further in 1993." Other
states have enacted rule changes that mirror the
MCCA. The MCCA has become something of a
"Model Act" (though required in its application)
for many states. For example, the State of Florida
enacted its rule changes in 1997.13
How the "Just Say No" rule will be applied and
litigated in each jurisdiction depends on federal
law, state law, and local custom. These materials
will discuss how New York and Florida have dealt
with the "Just Say No" rule. Although these two
states have almost identical rules, their laws differ
in application. For this reason, the New York and
Florida experiences, taken together, serve as a
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touchstone for other states. Because New York has
had more experience than any other state with the
"Just Say No" provisions, these materials will
point, as appropriate, to the New York experience
for guidance. These materials will use the Florida
rules as a guide on state practice because the
Florida rules mirror the federal MCCA.
Effective October 8, 1997, Florida's Depart-
ment of Children and Families adopted the "Just
Say No" rule. It reads:
(g) The institutionalized spouse may not be deter-
mined ineligible based on a community spouse's
resources if all of the following conditions are found
to exist:
1. The institutionalized individual is not eligible for
Medicaid institutional services because of the commu-
nity spouse's resources and the community spouse
refuses to use the resources for the institutionalized
spouse; and
2. The institutional spouse assigns to the state any
rights to support from the community spouse by sub-
mitting the Assignment of Support Rights form refer-
enced in Rule 65A-1.400, F.A.C., signed by the insti-
tutionalized spouse or their representative; and
3. The institutionalized spouse would be eligible if
only those resources to which they have access were
counted; and
4. The institutionalized spouse has no other means to
pay for the nursing home care.
14
In addition to the Florida Administrative Code,
Florida's Department of Children and Families
publishes its rules in an administrative manual-
the Integrated Public Assistance Policy Manual.
Therein appear the following:
If after declaring and verifying his/her assets, the com-
munity spouse refuses to make them available to the
client, the institutionalized spouse may assign his
rights of support to the state and obtain institutional
care benefits (refer to 1615.10.30.10 and
1615.10.30.15 for policy)."
Note, also, that the State of Florida, like most
other state Medicaid systems, does not honor
prenuptial agreements for the purposes of counting
assets. In order to ensure that an applicant cannot
rely upon a prenuptial agreement to safeguard his
or her spouse's assets, the government merely dis-
regards the agreements for purposes of counting
assets. The Florida rule states, "Assets that are
included in a prenuptial agreement are considered
part of the couple's total assets when determining
eligibility for institutional care services. This policy
applies regardless of when the prenuptial agree-
ment was drawn up." 16
The main policy statement regarding the right
to "Just Say No," appears as follows:
1615.10.30.10 Assignment of Support Rights (MA-SSI)
If the community spouse refuses to make available
assets attributed to the institutionalized spouse, the
institutionalized spouse may assign his rights of sup-
port to the state and obtain institutional care benefits.
This situation may arise when assets allocated to the
client actually solely belong to the community spouse
who, in turn, refuses to make them available to the
client. The institutionalized spouse may complete
HRS-AA 17 Form 2504, Assignment of Support Rights,
which allows the state to pursue recovery from the
community spouse. Refer to HRS Manual 165-24,
Integrated Public Assistance Forms Manual, for prop-
er completion (including who can sign the form). The
original copy of this form is to be sent to Economic
Self-Sufficiency Services, Policy Bureau, in Tallahassee,
Attention: SSI Related Program Staff. This form is not
an option that a worker suggests to an ineligible cou-
ple, but rather a solution to an existing situation
which is brought to the worker's attention."
When all conditions in section 1615.10.30.15
[Undue Hardship] are met, the allocated resources
being withheld by the community spouse will no longer
be considered available to the institutionalized spouse.
If the institutionalized spouse does not assign the
rights of support to the state, continue to consider the
assets available to the institutionalized individual."
1615.10.30.15 Undue Hardship.
" The institutionalized spouse will not be deter-
mined ineligible based on a community spouse's
resources if all of the following conditions are
found to exist:
* The institutionalized individual is not eligible due
to the community spouse's assets and the com-
munity spouse refuses to use the assets for the
institutionalized spouse; and
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The Assignment of Support Rights form (HRS
Form 2504) is signed; and
The institutionalized spouse would be eligible if
only those assets to which he/she has access were
counted; and
The institutionalized spouse has no other means
to pay for the nursing home care.
20
Rule 1615.10.30.15 tracks the language of the
federal MCCA.21 When read in their totality, the
rules and statutes allow an applicant to qualify for
Medicaid despite his or her community spouse
being over the CSRA. But there is a price to pay.
The institutionalized spouse must assign to the
state his right to be supported by the community
spouse.
The Right to Recover
Medicaid, in all fifty states, is designed to be the
payor of last resort.22 As such, the government may
properly look to all other sources prior to making
payments for long-term care. That is why, through-
out the state Medicaid rules, there is reference to
ineligibility based on monies available from any
other source.23
It is, therefore, proper for the government to
deny Medicaid eligibility to one who has other
means of support. It is also proper, by separate
rule, for the government to pursue reimbursement
from third parties. Federal law24 gives the govern-
ment the right to pursue third parties that should
have paid for care paid for by Medicaid. Many
states have enacted similar code provisions.2
An example of common language in state recov-
ery statutes is Florida's "Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act." 26 That Act provides that the state is
".... automatically subrogated to any rights that an
applicant . . . has to any third-party benefit to the
full amount of medical assistance provided by
Medicaid."'2 The law further provides that "[by]
applying for or accepting medical assistance, an
applicant ...automatically assigns to the [state]
any right, title and interest such person has to any
third-party benefit, ... 28 Thus, the state can seek
reimbursement of amounts paid for support from a
third party even when the Medicaid beneficiary
makes no written assignment of support rights.
Further empowering the state is the language that
"[bly accepting medical assistance, the recipient
grants to the [State] the limited power of attorney
to act in his or her name, place and stead to per-
form specific acts with regard to third-party bene-
fits . . "29 Pursuant to the Third-Party Liability
Act, Florida may stand in the place of the institu-
tionalized spouse with regard to monies available
for care. "The [State] may, as a matter of right, in
order to enforce its rights under this section, insti-
tute, intervene in, or join any legal or administra-
tive proceeding in its own name in one or more of
the following capacities: individually, as subrogee
of the recipient, as assignee of the recipient, or as
lienholder of the collateral.'3 °
Pursuant to state and federal law then, the gov-
ernment has a right to pursue third parties who
should be paying for the costs of care otherwise
being borne by the government. To be sure, the
form assigning the institutionalized spouse's right
of support to the state seems superfluous in light of
the broad mandate the states give themselves
through their third party liability acts. It seems,
then, that there is sound legislative support for the
government to recover against third parties that
should be paying costs of care.
The question that remains unanswered is
whether a community spouse is a third party that
should be responsible for costs of care. In other
words, the government has given itself a broad
power to go and recover monies from responsible
persons. Throughout the Medicaid rules, there is
an assumption that a community spouse has a sup-
port obligation to the institutionalized spouse. If
this is true, then a community spouse would be
subject to the federal and state third-party liability
(or recovery) acts. If, however, a community spouse
has no support obligation to the institutionalized
spouse, then there can be no recovery.
The Support Obligation
A brief recap: The institutionalized spouse applies
for ICP Medicaid. The community spouse reveals
his or her assets to the government and then states
his or her refusal to make those assets available to
the government. The institutionalized spouse then
assigns his or her right of support to the state.
But what if there is no right of support. The
"Just Say No" rules assume that the community
spouse has a legal obligation to pay for the institu-
tionalized spouse's long-term care. However, under
state law there may be no obligation of support.
Many states have a provision for an action of
support against a spouse even when unconnected
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with an action for dissolution of marriage.
According to the "Just Say No" rule, the govern-
ment could stand in the shoes of the institutional-
ized spouse and sue the community spouse for sup-
port. The government's forum for getting into
court is, therefore, this support action.3' However,
though there may be a forum to sue a spouse for
support, the courts cannot create an obligation
where none exists. A spouse can sue a spouse for
costs of nursing home care, but if no such obliga-
tion exists, it would be improper for a court to cre-
ate such an obligation.
Therefore, while the institutionalized spouse
may assign his or her rights of support to the state,
the right to nothing means an assignment of noth-
ing. In most states, there is no implied contract of
support obligations among husband and wife.
Moreover, many states have abrogated the com-
mon-law doctrine of necessaries-the responsibili-
ty to pay a spouse's debts.
In Connor v. Southwest Florida Regional
Medical Center, Inc.,32 the Florida Supreme Court
abrogated the state's common-law doctrine of nec-
essaries.33 The doctrine provided that one who sells
goods or services to one spouse may charge the
other spouse if the goods or services are required
for their sustenance or support. Some states have
adjusted the rule to allow for equal responsibilities
among the sexes. Those states require husband and
wife to be responsible for each other's necessaries.34
Other states predated Florida in abrogating the
doctrine altogether." In many states, however, there
is no common-law support obligation. In those
states that still have the common-law doctrine of
necessaries intact, the "Just Say No" action may be
just the case to garner its abrogation.
If there is no support obligation cognizable at
common law, the only other way a person could be
responsible is if a statute or rule explicitly makes
them responsible. In no state does a statute or rule
explicitly make a community spouse responsible
for the prospective long-term care costs of an insti-
tutionalized spouse. The state may argue, if in a
position to do so, that the Medicaid program in the
totality of its rules, evidences an intent to hold a
spouse liable for the care costs of the other spouse.
The argument's credence is that, throughout state
and federal law, there is constant reference to the
"countability" of a community spouse's assets.
But "countability" toward eligibility criteria
does not mean that spouses now have the legal
responsibility to support one another for long-term
care costs. That is a big leap that the courts (and
the voting public) should not be able to stomach.
Only New York State courts have examined the
"Just Say No" rules.
Two points need first to be made about New
York law. First, New York has a statute that pro-
vides that if a "responsible relative" with sufficient
income and resources to provide medical assistance
refuses to provide necessary assistance, the furnish-
ing of such assistance by the state "shall create an
implied contract with such relative and the cost
thereof may be recovered from such relative."3
Second, the doctrine of necessities is still intact in
New York.37 These are significant differences that
distinguish New York law from the law of most
states. Still, the following case is instructive.
In Commissioner v. Spellman," Mrs. Spellman
was a nursing home resident. Mr. Spellman was a
community spouse with resources of $233,160.
Mrs. Spellman qualified for Medicaid after Mr.
Spellman refused, in writing, to make his assets
available for his wife's nursing home care. Mrs.
Spellman executed an assignment of support from
Mr. Spellman. Mr. Spellman was subsequently sued
by the State of New York for $32,975, which the
state had paid to the nursing home. The state con-
tinued to pay for Mrs. Spellman's care at the rate of
$141.95 per day. Mr. Spellman brought a motion
to dismiss stating that there was no cognizable
cause of action against him. The state asserted its
right under third-party liability theory. Mr.
Spellman's motion to dismiss was denied.
On appeal to New York's intermediate appel-
late court, Mr. Spellman conceded that the state
may sue him for prospective support39 but claimed
that there can be no recovery for past Medicaid
payments because there is no implied contract
obligating Mr. Spellman to pay. Mr. Spellman also
argued that before the state can proceed against
him for reimbursement, the state must first sue him
for support in family court.
The court held first that there is no requirement
that the state bring a separate support action
against the community spouse in family court.'
The court recognized that the MCCA was intended
to soften the blow of an unforgiving Medicaid sys-
tem but also noted that,
[T]he MCCA ... was not intended to offer a financial
boon for applicants or to provide a route upon which
Elder's Advisor
one could bypass the obligation to contribute one's
fair share of the costs associated with nursing home
care.41
The court ruled that since Mr. Spellman had
resources above his CSRA, he may properly be
compelled to pay for his wife's care. 2 The appellate
court thereby affirmed the lower court's denial of
Mr. Spellman's motion to dismiss.43
Spellman's impact may be limited to New York
as it relied on a New York statute that implies a
contract between community spouse and state.
Moreover, the doctrine of necessaries is intact in
New York.
In all, there is no right of support that can be
found to owe from a community spouse to an insti-
tutionalized spouse. There is no statute creating
that right, no case law creating the right, the doc-
trine of necessaries has been abrogated or weak-
ened in many states, and the nationwide trend is to
abolish such spousal obligations." Though the
state may arguably take assignment of support
rights, the right to nothing means an assignment of
nothing.
Estate Recovery Against the "Refusing"
Spouse
It does not appear that the state has the right to sue
community spouses, but if any such right exists,
then it might also allow the state to recover from
the assets of the community spouse, even after
death. This has not been seen in any reported or
known cases.
The only reported case bearing on the govern-
ment's right to recover against the estate of a refus-
ing spouse is In re Craig.45 In Craig, the issue was
whether the government could recover amounts
paid by Medicaid for care of a man, who had since
died, from the estate of the man's wife when the
wife refused to pay for her husband's care during
her lifetime. The Craigs lived very modestly and, at
Mrs. Craig's death, her estate had a total of
$27,348.50, most of which came from her home.
Her personal representative paid over $10,000 to
the state to repay Medicaid for payment it had
made for Mrs. Craig's care, but the personal repre-
sentative declined to pay the state for Mr. Craig's
care. The court found that the assertion of a nunc
pro tunc claim against a refusing spouse's estate is
not supportable where she lacked sufficient means
to pay during her lifetime."
Just Saying No
The process for application under "Just Say No" is
as follows:
1. After the couple enters into a relevant postnup-
tial agreement (if allowed under state law), they
must file an application for assistance showing
all assets titled in the institutionalized spouse's
name alone, the community spouse's name
alone, and all joint assets.
2. The application should be accompanied by a
statement of refusal signed by the community
spouse.
3. The institutionalized spouse (or agent) signs an
Assignment of Rights to Support. Most states
have promulgated such a form by administra-
tive rule. If the state has not created such a
form, counsel should prepare the minimum
assignment necessary to placate the state.
4. The application is processed with the govern-
ment retaining the right to review all assets
including those of the refusing spouse, but the
determination of eligibility is processed as
though a single person were applying. So long
as the applicant is under his or her asset cap of
$2,000, ' and meets the income test,48 the appli-
cant is financially eligible.
5. Once eligibility is determined, the state makes
payments to the nursing home or assisted-living
facility.
But let us imagine the following:
6. The community spouse receives a letter from
the state making a claim for past, and possibly
future repayments, and demanding immediate
payment.
7. The amount sought by the state cannot exceed
what it has paid. This is an interesting issue
because it means that even if the state does sue
and is successful, it can only receive the
Medicaid reimbursement rate, which is signifi-
cantly lower than the private pay rate. Because
the community spouse would only have to pay
what the state pays, the community spouse is
still better off than if she or he privately paid for
the other spouse's care.
8. If the community spouse refuses to pay the
amount demanded, the state might then sue the
community spouse. Imagine, though, the public
perception of the state suing grandmothers and
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grandfathers for the costs of nursing home care.
Imagine also the resources it would take for the
state to pursue such claims.49
9. The case may settle or go to trial. If the case set-
tles, the community spouse will likely pay only
a percentage of the demand. If the case goes to
trial, attorneys for the community spouse will
have a very good case against spousal liability.
As a practice note, counsel should be aware that
even if a community spouse exercises his or her
right to "just say no," transfer rules still apply. In
all states, an applicant is deemed to be ineligible for
Medicaid (for a period of time that varies by for-
mula from state to state) as a result of gifts made
by the applicant or the applicant's spouse. Gifts
made by a "refusing" spouse are treated no differ-
ently. Therefore, though the assets of the commu-
nity spouse may not be calculated toward the insti-
tutionalized spouse's eligibility, gifts made by the
community spouse may cause a period of ineligibil-
ity for the institutionalized spouse.
The fact is that in New York, where the "Just
Say No" option was a predominant form of
Medicaid estate planning, the state has only recent-
ly-in the past four years-been aggressively pur-
suing recovery. Even then, the state is not going
after all cases. All reported cases are from the New
York City area and are usually involving high dol-
lar amounts. In other counties in New York, it is
rare to see a claim made against a community
spouse."0 In Florida, the state has not once pursued
recovery against a community spouse.
Conclusion
"Just Say No" is not without risk, but it is a sound
option for the married, elder client.
The government clearly intends to assume a
spouse's responsibility for the catastrophic health
care costs of the other spouse. But nowhere in the
law is there support for such a position. In fact, it
would go against public policy to require a spouse
to pay for the care costs of another spouse. Were it
otherwise, the law would encourage divorce and/or
quick spend-downs or other sheltering techniques
that would divest both spouses of control.
Spouses have the right to refuse to become
impoverished at the expense of the other spouse,
and this is just what "Just Say No" allows. The
ability to control one's finances from the obliga-
tions of one's spouse is a fundamental right of all
married persons. People in later marriages do not
have more rights, but it surely makes the case.
Harken back to Daniel and Dottie. Without
"Just Say No," Dottie's assets (which were accu-
mulated through the sweat of her and her first hus-
band) would go toward Daniel's nursing home care
and could not be preserved for Dottie or her chil-
dren. This is manifestly unfair when one considers
that she and Daniel exercised their right to enter
into a prenuptial agreement that sought to limit or
eliminate their liability to each other. By "just say-
ing no," Dottie and Daniel only give effect to an
understanding that was manifest between them.
But "Just Say No" is not just for second mar-
riages and not just for those who entered into nup-
tial agreements (though it makes for a better case).
The "Just Say No" rules allow: (1) the community
spouse to avoid becoming impoverished; (2) the
community spouse to supplement the institutional-
ized spouse's care; (3) the couple to realize a bene-
fit from saving for their future; (4) the couple to
remain married; and (5) the community spouse to
retain control and independence.
Justice Bracken of the New York Appellate
Division penned the most cogent conclusion on the
right to "Just Say No" when he wrote, "[N]o
agency of the government has any right to com-
plain about the fact that middle class people con-
fronted with desperate circumstances choose vol-
untarily to inflict poverty upon themselves when it
is the government itself which has established the
rule that poverty is a prerequisite to the receipt of
government assistance in the defraying of the costs
of ruinously expensive, but absolutely essential,
medical treatment." In re Shah, 694 N.Y.S.2d 82,
87 (App. Div. 1999).
Endnotes
1. The states are required to maintain an "asset cap"
in the state Medicaid program. The "asset cap"
varies from state to state. In Florida, the asset cap
is $2,000 for a single person. In New York, it is
$3,500. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1396r-5.
2. The term "community spouse" means a spouse of
an institutionalized applicant for Medicaid, who is
not himself or herself applying for Medicaid insti-
tutional care program benefits. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r-5(h).
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3. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-5(c)(2)(A).
4. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1396r-5(f)(2).
5. The CSRA and the concomitant right of a spouse
to refuse availability of his or her assets that trans-
forms Medicaid from a purely welfare program to
a program intended to extend protections to a vul-
nerable middle class, at least as it applies to mar-
ried couples where only one spouse is institutional-
ized.
6. Year 2000 figure.
7. Divorce is rarely necessary when a couple receives
sound legal advice from an experienced elder law
attorney. Still, many seniors who do not know of
elder law protections, or who come from a state
where divorce is widely practiced as an asset preser-
vation method, are forced into an act they would
never have voluntarily chosen. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey has recognized divorce as a legiti-
mate response to the inequities in the Medicaid sys-
tem. See L.M. v. State, 659 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1995).
8. For some couples, this may mean transferring all of
the assets from the ill spouse to the community
spouse in advance of a Medicaid application. The
community spouse may then exercise his or her
right of spousal refusal. Indeed, the New York
Court of Appeals has held that a community
"spouse, qualified as guardian, is permitted to
transfer to herself, for purposes of Medicaid plan-
ning, the entire assets of her incapacitated spouse."
In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1094 (N.Y. 2000).
9. See Daniel Fish, The New York "Just Say No"
Experience, in Florida Bar Elder Law Annual
Public Benefits Seminar at 3.1 (1998).
10. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-5.
11. Id. at § 1396r-5(c)(3).
12. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 366(a) (2000); 18 N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, S 360-4.10(c)(4)
(2000).
13. See Section II Proposed Rules, 23 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 25 (June 20, 1997).
14. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65A-1.712(3)(g) (2000).
15. Florida Integrated Public Assistance Policy Manual
Rule 1615.10.30 (hereinafter referred to as IPAP).
16. IPAP Rule 1615.10.30.05. It occurs to the author
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34. See, e.g., Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618
N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1993); St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr.,
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46. See id. at 1004.
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